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Bank financing for SMEs – lessons from the literature 
 
Thorsten Beck
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Abstract: This paper surveys the recent literature on the relationship between SMEs, 
financial deepening and economic development. While a large SME sector is not associated 
with faster economic growth or poverty alleviation, financial deepening can have a pro-
growth and pro-poor impact by disproportionally alleviating SMEs’ financing constraints, 
enabling new entry of firms and entrepreneurs, and better resource allocation.  It is important 
to differentiate between different segments of the SME population, most critically between 
subsistence micro entrepreneurs and transformational entrepreneurs.  There is strong 
evidence that long-term institution building, including contractual and information 
frameworks, contribute to easing SMEs’ financing constraints, with supportive evidence for 
specific policy interventions.  There is no unambiguous evidence on the relationship between 
market structure and SMEs’ access to finance.  Foreign-owned and larger banks are as likely 
to cater to SMEs as smaller and local banks, but using different lending techniques and where 
the necessary institutional framework is in place in the country.  There is also evidence that 
SMEs are more strongly affected by banking crises and that regulatory policies have 
important repercussions for SME lending.  
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1. Introduction 
The vast majority of firms around the world fall into the category of micro, small or medium-
sized enterprises.  In terms of enterprises, more than 95% fall into this category; but even in 
terms of employment in low and lower-middle income countries, more than 50% of 
employees work in companies with fewer than 100 employees (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2011b). This seemingly justifies the statement that “SMEs are the emerging 
private sector in poor countries and thus form the base for private sector-led growth” 
(Hallberg, 2001). 
 
Policy efforts targeted at SMEs have often been justified with arguments that (1) SMEs are 
an engine of innovation and growth and (2) they help reduce poverty because they are labor-
intensive and thus stimulate job growth, but (3) they are constrained by institutional and 
market failures.  Cross-country, country-level, and microeconomic studies, however, confirm 
only the last of these three claims, while there is at best mixed evidence on the first two.  
 
This paper surveys the literatures  (1) on the role of SMEs in economic development and the 
growth obstacles they face, (2) on the importance of financial development in leveling the 
playing field between firms of different sizes, and (3) on specific policy levers to maximize 
the impact of finance on SMEs.  These research areas have been very active over the past ten 
years, partly driven by the availability of large firm-level panel datasets, both on the national 
as well as on the international level, and loan-level data from credit registries, but also driven 
by the increased use of randomized control trials (RCTs) to assess the effectiveness of 
specific interventions.  
 
Given the importance of SMEs in developing countries’ private sectors and the claims 
described above, it is not surprising that policy makers and bilateral and multilateral donors 
have been focusing on SME finance as a priority area for policy advice and intervention.  The 
G20 has established a Committee on SME Finance, co-chaired by Germany and South Africa 
and has supported the “G20 SME Finance Challenge”, a competition for innovative solutions 
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to overcome SMEs’ financing constraints.2 Many suggestions for financial sector reforms are 
tested for their impact on SMEs, including regulatory reform discussions, such as those on 
Basel 3. And in the context of the current crisis in Europe, there are many references to SMEs 
being the segment of the enterprise population suffering most.  
 
Before proceeding, I would like to focus on two definitions.  First, what are micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises?  The definition of such enterprises varies across countries and 
often even within countries across financial institutions. Criteria used to differentiate between 
micro, small and medium-sized, and large enterprises include employees, assets or 
sales/turnover.
3
 Another important distinction is between formal and informal enterprises, 
where the latter are often seen as synonymous with micro-enterprises. Beyond specific 
threshold-based definitions, it is important to note that the distinction goes beyond pure size 
and relates to organizational, behavioral and other dimensions, along which these three 
groups (micro, small and medium-sized and large) differ. This also justifies why the actual 
definition varies across countries – what is small in the U.S. might be large in Zambia.4  
Further below, I will also make the point that it is important to distinguish between two 
groups of micro and small entrepreneurs – those that start business out of the lack of an 
attractive salaried job and transformational entrepreneurs.  
 
Second, it is important to define SME finance and distinguish it from microfinance. The 
heading SME finance typically refers to financial services catered specifically to small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  This “segment-approach” sees SMEs as one of several client 
segments, with other segments being “corporate”, i.e. larger enterprises, and “retail”.  This is 
also consistent with the way many banks structure their organization focusing staff and 
procedures on specific client segments. This also implies different lending techniques, 
                                                   
2
 http://www.changemakers.com/en-us/SME-Finance 
3
 The MSME country indicator database, maintained by the IFC defines micro-enterprises as those with fewer 
than 10 employees, medium-size as those with 50 to 249 employees and small enterprises with those between 10 
and 49 employees.  See Kushnir, Mirmulstein and Ramalho (2010) for details.  
4
 See Gibson and van der Vaart (2008) for a detailed discussion of cross-country variation in SME definitions 
and the usefulness of different criteria.  They suggest that SMEs be defined as formal enterprises with annual 
turnover of between 10 and 1000 times GDP per capita of a country.  
4 
 
product differentiation and possibly even different delivery channels for SMEs as opposed to 
large enterprises and retails clients.  It is also important in this context to differentiate 
between SME finance and microfinance.  Microfinance is rarely undertaken by banks, much 
more by NGOs or specialized microfinance banks, institutions that often have a double or 
triple bottom-line, emphasizing - in addition to profit - social impact and sustainable 
development. Critically, lending techniques differ between microfinance and SME finance, 
with the latter being based more on hard collateral, and business assessment and the former 
more on “personal collateral” and group and community pressure. 
 
In a broader sense, SME finance refers to a set of institutions and policies that aim at leveling 
the playing field across enterprises of different sizes in terms of access to financial services. 
In this broader definition, it refers to judicial reforms, the establishment of registries, partial 
credit guarantees and other regulatory and tax policies that ease SMEs’ access to finance. 
 
The remainder of this survey is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses evidence on the link 
between SMEs, job creation and economic development and the specific role of financial 
deepening in alleviating SMEs’ financing constraints and thus enhancing economic 
development. Section 3 discusses the importance of distinguishing between different sub-
group among micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.  Section 4 introduces the concept of 
the access possibilities frontier as conceptual tool to discuss different policy interventions.  
Section 5 discusses the evidence on specific policy dimensions, including competition and 
market structure, regulatory policies and the impact of the current crisis on SME finance and 
section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  SMEs, financial development and economic development  
While there is a positive correlation between the share of small and medium enterprises in 
manufacturing and GDP per capita growth, there is no evidence that this relationship is causal, 
i.e. that having a high share of SMEs helps countries grow faster or reduce poverty at faster 
rates (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2005). Successful economies thus have more SMEs, 
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but their success is not explained by having lots of SMEs. However, there is evidence that 
financial deepening can contribute to economic growth and ultimately poverty reduction by 
easing SMEs’ financing constraints. Such effects are not always direct, but indirect through 
better resource allocation across the economy.  I will discuss evidence on this below.  
 
One channel through which SMEs are conjectured to address poverty is through job creation. 
Some argue that SME expansion boosts employment more than large firm growth because 
SMEs are more labor intensive (Birch, 1979, 1981, 1987). On the other hand, some other 
research finds that SMEs are neither more labor intensive, nor better at job creation than large 
firms (Little et al., 1987). Recent cross-country survey evidence suggests that smaller firms 
do not only offer most of the jobs across the world (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 
2007), but also create more jobs than larger firms (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2011b), though it seems somewhat difficult to draw such conclusions from 
survey data. Specifically, cross-sectional firm-level survey data do not allow controlling for 
survivor bias
5
 and composition effects
6
 and distinguishing between net and gross job creation.  
In a more limited sample for five Sub-Saharan African countries with panel data, Biggs and 
Shah (1998) find that large firms account for the majority of job creation in four of the five 
countries. Page and Sonderbom (2012) find a similar job net creation by small and large firms 
for a long panel data series for Ethiopia. While gross job creation is larger for small firms, 
this effect is countered by a lower survival likelihood of small firms.  Klapper and Richmond 
(2013) find for registered firms in Cote d’Ivoire that the probability of survival increases 
monotonically with firm size, while Liedholm (2001) reports for other African countries that 
there is no relationship between firm size at start-up and survivor probability. In summary, 
there is currently no robust evidence that small firms are better in net job creation than large 
firms.   But even so, it is not clear that these jobs would directly help the poor:  Using data for 
Bangladesh, Bauchet and Morduch (2013) find that employees of SMEs are significantly less 
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poor than microfinance clients (mostly micro-entrepreneurs). Overall, there is thus no hard 
evidence on a link from a larger SME segment to more job creation and more specifically for 
job creation for the poor.  
 
While there is thus no unambiguous evidence on a positive impact of a large SME segment 
per se on economic development, job creation and/or poverty alleviation, cross-country 
research has pointed to the institutional and business environment—including well-defined 
property rights, both between private parties and protection against government expropriation; 
effective contract enforcement; competitive product, labor, and capital markets; and a legal 
framework that allows for relatively easy entry and exit of enterprises—as an important 
factor for economic development.
7
 Critical in this context is the financial sector. An extensive 
literature has documented the pro-growth and pro-poor effect of financial deepening, 
especially in developing countries.
8
 As I will argue in the following, this effect works to a 
large extent through easing SMEs’ financing constraints.9  
 
There is significant evidence that financial deepening can help create jobs, and there is 
evidence that this partly happens through expanding SME finance. On the aggregate level, 
Pagano and Pica (2011) show a positive and significant relationship between financial 
development (using a standard measure, Private Credit to GDP) and job creation in 
developing countries. For the U.S., Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010) show that branch 
deregulation and consequent financial liberalization led to decreases in unemployment and 
increased labor market participation especially among low-skilled workers. Gine and 
Townsend (2004) show for Thailand that financial liberalization has contributed to migration 
of subsistence agricultural workers into urban salaried jobs.  In addition, there are a variety of 
studies showing the importance of financial development for growth of SMEs. While other 
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business environment obstacles are also important, these are often interrelated with finance, 
and even when these interactions are controlled for as well as they can be in a cross-country 
setting, access to finance seems to emerge consistently as one of the most important and 
robust underlying factors that constrain firm growth (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2008). There is evidence that financial development helps reduce the effect of 
financing obstacles on firm growth, with a disproportionally beneficial effect for small and 
medium-sized enterprises and financial development exerts a disproportionately large 
positive effect on the growth of industries that are naturally composed of more small firms 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; Beck et al., 2008). 
 
Quasi-natural experimental evidence confirms the importance of credit constraints for firm 
growth. Analyzing detailed loan information on 253 Indian SMEs’ before and after they 
became eligible for a directed subsidized lending program, Banerjee and Duflo (2008) find 
that the additional credit resulted in a proportional increase in sales rather than a substitution 
for other non-subsidized credit, indicating that these firms were credit constrained before 
receiving subsidized credit. Similarly, Zia (2008) finds that small non-listed and non-group 
firms in Pakistan reduce their sales after they become ineligible for subsidized export credit, 
indicating the existence of credit constraints; in contrast, large, listed and group firms do not 
reduce their sales after losing access to subsidized credit. Going even further down the size 
scale, De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) use a randomized experiment in Sri Lanka to 
test the productivity of capital by providing small grants to a group of microentrepreneurs and 
comparing their returns to a control group. These researchers find annualized returns of 55 to 
63 percent.  It is important to note that this evidence is suggestive of credit constraints and 
not evidence in favor of credit subsidies given the partial equilibrium and short-term 
character of the analysis. 
 
Alleviating financing constraints of SMEs and leveling the playing field between firms of 
different sizes is thus an important channel through which financial deepening can have 
direct and indirect impacts on firm and aggregate growth. The literature has identified 
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different specific channels, through which financial development affects firm and ultimately 
aggregate growth. First, the availability of external finance is positively associated with the 
number of start-ups—an important indicator of entrepreneurship—as well as with firm 
dynamism and innovation (e.g., Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta, 2007; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2011a). Second, finance also allows existing firms to exploit growth 
and investment opportunities, and to achieve larger equilibrium size (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006). Finally, firms can safely acquire a more efficient productive 
asset portfolio where the infrastructure of finance is in place, and they are also able to choose 
more efficient organizational forms such as incorporation (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt, Love and 
Maksimovic, 2006).  
 
In summary, financing constraints are not only higher for smaller firms, but are also more of 
a growth impediment for smaller than for larger enterprises.  Financial deepening helps 
alleviate these constraints and their impeding impact on SMEs’ growth. By alleviating SMEs’ 
financing constraints, a well developed financial sector ultimately contributes to job creation 
and poverty alleviation, by allowing more entrepreneurship, faster firm expansion and more 
efficient resource allocation.  Further below, we will drill a bit deeper and consider specific 
dimensions of the financial deepening process and their relationship with SME finance. 
Specifically, we will discuss different financing forms and different institutions that can cater 
to SMEs.   
 
3.  Differentiating among different firms 
The transmission channels through which SME finance affects economic development might 
differ with different segments within the large population of SMEs; specifically, micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises. While all three types of enterprises suffer from financing 
constraints and other obstacles in the business environment, policies and interventions to 
overcome them vary significantly across these firm types. In addition to the size distinction, 
there are other characteristics, including age and sector, that call for different approaches and 
that might imply different channels through which financial deepening affects poverty. 
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Subsistence entrepreneurs have tiny businesses, based on self-employment and informality 
and are almost exclusively micro-entrepreneurs. Many of these enterprises are set up out of 
lack of alternative employment options for the owner in the formal sector. They rely almost 
exclusively on the owner, maybe with support from family members and/or friends. There is 
evidence that such subsistence entrepreneurs make up the majority of microenterprises.  De 
Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2010) show that only 30 percent of microenterprise owners 
in Sri Lanka have characteristics like large firm owners, whereas 70 percent are similar to 
wage workers. Bruhn (2013) finds that about 50 percent of a sample of Mexican micro-
entrepreneurs are similar to wage workers. This indicates that a large share of microenterprise 
owners may be running their business to make a living while they are looking for a wage job 
and may not have plans for expanding the business.  Liedholm (2001) provides additional 
evidence by reporting findings from the Dominican Republic and Zimbabwe: during periods 
of rapid growth, employment growth comes from existing enterprises hiring workers, while 
the contribution to overall employment from net firm creation is actually negative. By 
contrast, during economic downturns, the contribution of existing enterprises to overall 
employment growth is lower or negative and employment growth from net firm creation is 
positive, suggesting that these new firms might be former wage workers. 
 
Very different from these subsistence entrepreneurs are transformational entrepreneurs, who 
are often leading larger enterprises that create jobs, while microfinance clients are only rarely 
of the transformational kind. For long-term effect on aggregate growth and job creation, a 
stronger focus on transformational enterprises is therefore needed.
10
 This is also consistent 
with Fafchamps and Woodruff (2011) who suggest that different programs should be targeted 
at different groups: “programs on expansion, employee management and innovation for those 
with more growth potential” and “ programs on mitigating risk and increasing income for 
those not likely to expand.” 
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The distinction between subsistence and transformational entrepreneurs is also important 
when assessing the impact of policy reforms. Bruhn (2013), for example, finds that easing the 
process of business registration in Mexico led to an increase of business registration among 
entrepreneurial types, but a decrease among wage earner type entrepreneurs who were rather 
more likely to become wage earners after the reform.
11
 Similarly, Aterido, Hallward-
Driemeier and Pages (2009) show that the distinction between small and micro-enterprises 
can be a very important one. Using enterprise survey data across 90 countries, they show that 
small firms with more than 10 employees are negatively affected by an adverse business 
environment to a larger extent than micro-enterprises with fewer than 10 employees. 
 
Distinguishing between different segments among SMEs is also important in terms of their 
financing needs and the different options to ease their financing constraints. Informal micro-
entrepreneurs seem “ideal” clients for micro-finance institutions, which rely on community 
links and “informal types” of collateral12 for their lending.  Many medium-sized enterprises, 
on the other extreme, might be candidates to look beyond the banking system towards capital 
market types of finance, including private equity funds or even listing on secondary boards of 
stock exchanges with lower listing requirements.  The segment in between, the “small” 
enterprises, seems the trickiest one, as they are often limited to banks as their only provider of 
formal finance.  
 
4. Differentiating between different policy levers – the access possibilities frontier 
Financial deepening is the outcome of structural country characteristics and financial sector 
policies. While financial sector deepening in general contributes to alleviating SMEs’ 
financing constraints, there are also specific policies that can help SMEs overcome their 
financing constraints. In the following I will use the concept of the access possibilities 
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frontier to discuss different categories of financial sector policies and interventions before 
turning to empirical evidence for different policies and interventions (see Beck and de la 
Torre, 2007 for a more in-depth discussion).  
 
Transaction costs and information asymmetries drive the variation in access to finance across 
firms of different sizes. Fixed transaction costs in credit assessment, processing, and 
monitoring result in a decrease of unit costs as the size of the loan increases, which makes 
lending to SMEs more costly.  In addition to transaction costs, SME lending, more than other 
lending products, is affected by challenges in managing risks.  Compared with large firms, 
SMEs are commonly more opaque, less likely to be able to post collateral, and often do not 
have audited financial statements that allow a better picture of the enterprise and its projected 
profits. Compared to retail clients, financial institutions can rely less on the law of large 
numbers to exploit scale economies and diversification benefits.
13
   
 
Lending techniques, government policies and structural characteristics of financial systems 
and economies affect the extent to which transactions costs and risk reduce SMEs’ access to 
external funding. We define as the access possibilities frontier the maximum share of SMEs 
applying for loans that can be served by financial institutions in a commercially viable way 
(see Figure 1, Point I, A).
14
 This concept implies that, in many economies, a large share of 
micro-enterprises and even small formal firms might not be bankable from a commercial 
viewpoint. This frontier—and thus the share of bankable SME loan applicants A—is 
determined by technology as well as the institutional framework within which financial 
institutions operate.
15
 However, a financial system can very well operate either below or 
above this frontier, as I will discuss in the following. 
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Figure 1: Access possibilities frontier for credit 
 
Source: Beck and de la Torre (2007) 
Figure 2: Access possibilities frontier for credit – changes in state variables 
 
Source: Beck and de la Torre (2007) 
 
We can use the access possibilities frontier to identify several types of access to credit 
problems. A first type of access problem is demand-originated. This problem may be evident 
in too low a number of loan applicants simply because of self-exclusion resulting from 
13 
 
cultural barriers or financial illiteracy.  Alternatively, there may be a lack of profitable 
investment projects in the economy that deserve financing based on their expected return. 
This problem can actually not be illustrated in our figure as it focuses on loan applicants. 
 
A 
second type of access problem can arise from regulatory distortions or insufficient 
contestability that cause lenders not to fully exploit all the outreach opportunities and thus 
settle at a point below the access possibilities frontier (Figure 1, Point II, B).  A third and 
very different access problem is associated with “excess access,” that is, an equilibrium 
above the access possibilities frontier with loans being granted to a larger share of loan 
applicants than is prudently warranted or SMEs achieve too high a leverage, given the 
lending interest rate and the institutional framework (Figure 1, Point III, C). A final access 
problem consists of too low a prudent access possibilities frontier, caused by deficiencies in 
an economy’s institutional framework compared with that of countries with similar levels of 
economic development.  An improvement along these lines would lead to an expansion of the 
frontier from S* to S*’’ in Figure 2. Similarly, lower opportunity costs of funding (imc), e.g. 
due to better macroeconomic conditions, will increase the universe of potential loan 
applicants receiving finance (Figure 2, Point II, B). 
 
Each of these types of access problems calls for different policies.  The first—demand-
originated problems—calls for demand-side measures that educate and encourage the healthy 
use of financial products by SMEs.  While the literature has traditionally focused on supply-
side constraints, the last couple of years have seen several financial literacy randomized 
control trials (RCTs) for entrepreneurs, including in Uganda (McKenzie and Weber, 2009), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bruhn and Zia, 2013), Peru (Karlan and Valdivia, 2011), 
Dominican Republic (Drexler, Fischer and Schoar, 2010), Sri Lanka (De Mel, McKenzie and 
Woodruff, 2012), Pakistan (Gine and Mansuri, 2011) and Central America (Klinger and 
Schündeln, 2011). There is a large variation in findings, with a general conclusion being that 
tailor-made interventions can have an impact on entrepreneurship and business expansion 
under certain circumstances.   But as s stressed by McKenzie and Woodruff (2012) in their 
14 
 
summary, these assessments have provided some answers, but “many of the key questions 
needed to justify large-scale policy interventions in this area remain unanswered.” 
 
The second problem calls for interventions and policies that encourage financial institutions 
to maximize outreach to SMEs within the existing contractual and macroeconomic 
environment. Conversely, restraining measures may be called for when loans are being 
provided to numbers of applicants beyond what can be considered prudent.  The final type of 
problem, too low a prudent access frontier, requires a set of policies that provide for general 
reforms of the business environment and institutional framework that are not specific to the 
SME lending market.  However, as we will discuss in the next section, the business model 
and lending techniques available to financial institutions also have a critical impact on the 
frontier.  In the following, I will discuss these different policies in more depth. 
 
Supply-side constraints can arise from regulatory distortions or insufficient contestability that 
cause lenders to not fully exploit all the outreach opportunities and thus settling at a point 
below the access possibilities frontier.  Interventions can be both at the institution level as 
well as at the policy level. On the institution level, this can include upgrading of screening, 
monitoring and risk management systems, with the goal of lower costs and better risk 
management translating into higher outreach. While there might be thus a direct and possibly 
quick impact on the institution level, gauged by outreach indicators, there might be 
repercussions throughout the banking and even broader financial system, through 
demonstration or competition effects. Such effects can arise both by helping an incumbent or 
a new entrant.  Two recent papers show the effect of branch expansion by one specific 
institution on access to financial services and business creation; Allen et al. (2012) show that 
the expansion of Equity Bank in Kenya using new delivery channels and techniques 
increased use of formal financial services especially among previously unbanked population 
groups, while Bruhn and Love (2013) show that the expansion of Banco Azetca in Mexico 
increased entrepreneurial activity, labor market participation and ultimately income levels.  
On the policy level, interventions to push the financial system include (but are not limited to) 
15 
 
removing regulatory constraints, related to provisioning and loan classification guidelines 
related to collateral or loan repayment schedules, client documentation requirements, taxation 
issues (such as VAT on leasing), and entry barriers into the financial system.   Addressing 
these constraints on the policy level will have indirect impacts on the financial system and 
might have differential effects on the outreach effort by different financial institutions. It 
might have also indirect impact by enabling the entry of new providers targeting previously 
unbanked entrepreneurs. 
 
Beyond targeting competition per se, governments can also try to produce a movement 
towards the possibilities frontier by addressing hindrances such as coordination failures, first 
mover disincentives, and obstacles to risk distribution and sharing. While not easy to define 
in general terms, given their variety, these government interventions tend to share a common 
feature in creating incentives for private lenders and investors to step in, without unduly 
shifting risks and costs to the government (de la Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler, 2006).  
 
Partial credit guarantee (PCG) schemes feature prominently among market-activist policies.
16
   
While they also exist on a private basis, governments and donors have been aggressively 
pushing for their establishment to overcome the limited access to bank credit SMEs face.  By 
providing a guarantee, such a scheme can help overcome the lack of collateral of many SMEs, 
but issues of appropriate pricing, funding and the institutional structure are important.  While 
such schemes could be run on a self-sustainable basis, they often involve significant subsidies 
and contingent fiscal liabilities to cover losses.   While it is difficult to compute such costs 
ex-ante, it is even more difficult to measure the benefits, which would be partially captured 
by additionality, i.e. the share of borrowers that would not have gained access to finance if it 
were not for the PCG.   An even more accurate measure would be the extent to which 
borrowers that would have gotten access to credit in a world without market frictions, could 
access the credit market due to PGCs, minus the extent to which borrowers gained access 
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through the PCG that would not have gotten access in a friction-free world.   Ultimately, the 
cost of any government intervention has to take into account the return on each dollar of 
taxpayer’s money in such an intervention compared to other interventions, including 
interventions outside the financial sector.  While most of the literature has focused on the 
potential benefits of credit guarantees, the risks should not be ignored. Partial credit 
guarantees can be used for regulatory arbitrage purposes (Honohan, 2010). In addition, 
poorly designed guarantee schemes (e.g. high guarantee shares, and limited screening and 
monitoring requirements) and political interference can create incentives for banks to take 
aggressive risks that turn into contingent and ultimately realized fiscal liabilities.
17
  
 
There have been few rigorous impact assessments of partial credit guarantees, though the few 
that have been undertaken point to a somewhat positive effect, as by Lelarge, Sraer, and 
Thesmar (2010) in the case of the French credit guarantee scheme. Two separate studies 
suggest that the Chilean scheme FOGAPE has generated additional loans for new and 
existing bank clients and that the additional loans have led to higher sales and profit growth 
(Cowan, Drexler, and Yañez 2009; Larrain and Quiroz 2006) However, another study 
questions the additionality effect as approximately 80 percent of the firms that benefit from 
the guarantees had bank loans in the past (Benavente, Galetovic, and Sanhueza 2006). A 
recent evaluation of the British Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme, introduced in 2009 to 
alleviate SMEs’ financing constraints during the crisis, offers some evidence on additionality, 
though this is based on self-reported firm responses and relies on a sample of matched 
enterprises (Allinson, Robson and Stone, 2013).  More evidence is needed to gauge what 
characteristics constitute a successful credit guarantee scheme, exploiting the large variation 
in experiences across countries. 
 
A different access problem consists of an access possibilities frontier that is lower than in 
comparable countries, due to deficiencies in the macroeconomic and institutional framework 
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 The housing boom and bust cycle in the U.S. ending in 2006 has to a large extent been attributed to political 
pressure in favor of house ownership and guarantees provided through government-sponsored enterprises, such 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Rajan, 2010).  
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compared to countries with similar levels of economic development. These constraints call 
for general reforms of the business environment and institutional framework that are not 
necessarily specific to the SME lending market. One institution that can have a positive 
impact on lending to SMEs is the introduction of credit registries or bureaus. Brown, Jappelli 
and Pagano (2009) show for a sample of transition economies that the introduction or 
upgrade of credit registries in the 2000s reduced SMEs’ financing constraints.  By enhancing 
competition in the banking system, credit registries can help expand outreach, by either 
increasing competition among incumbent banks or easing the entry of new players. As is the 
case with policies that help push the financial system towards the frontier, the effects on 
SMEs’ access and use of external finance is an indirect one, with the effect not to be expected 
in the short-term. The effect can show both in lower, but also more differentiated interest 
rates for SMEs (better reflecting their riskiness) as well as a larger share of SMEs with 
external finance. The effect should also be a differential one across enterprises of different 
sizes, with smaller and more opaque enterprises benefiting more (Love and Mylenko, 2003). 
Another important institutional innovation can be improvements in movable collateral 
frameworks. Love, Martínez Pería, and Singh (2012) explore the impact of introducing 
collateral registries for movable assets across 73 countries. Their results suggest a positive 
effect of introducing movable collateral registries on firms' access to finance, an effect 
stronger among smaller firms.  
 By expanding the variety of assets that can be used as collateral, a sound and effective 
collateral regime is especially important for SMEs’ access to finance. Haselmann, Pistor and 
Vig (2009) show that changes in collateral laws were more important than changes in 
bankruptcy laws for the expansion of credit in twelve transition economies in the 1990s. 
However, there is also countervailing evidence on the effect of strengthening creditor rights 
by negatively affecting the demand side.  Using cross-country comparisons, Acharya and 
Subramian (2009) and Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2011) show that higher creditor rights 
lead to lower corporate risk-taking and less innovation.   Vig (2013) shows for India that 
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strengthening creditor right in the context of a securitization reform led to a reduction in 
secured debt and an increase in liquidity hoarding by firms.  
 
For completeness, I would like to mention a final access problem that is associated with 
“excess access,” that is, an equilibrium above the access possibilities frontier with loans 
being granted to a larger share of loan applicants than is prudently warranted, given the 
lending interest rate and the institutional framework. Most of this literature has focused on 
the more general nature of credit boom and bust cycles (Claessens, Kose and Terrones, 2011), 
on housing finance at the core of such cycles and less so specifically on SME finance. The 
Global Financial Crisis and still unfolding Eurozone crisis has provided several examples of 
asset price and credit bubbles, often linked to housing finance. Examples from the Central 
and Eastern Europe also point to the risk of foreign currency lending – while in the short-term, 
such lending offers attractive terms to borrowers in the form of lower interest rates, it 
involves high risk, especially in the case of sharp and unexpected exchange rate depreciations. 
While larger enterprises have higher expertise and capacity to manage and hedge such risks, 
SMEs might not have this capacity.
18
  
 
Avoiding the financial system from moving beyond the prudential frontier and thus avoiding 
excess leveraging of SMEs is a rather tricky task, as bubbles are often only recognized as 
such once they are well under way or after they have burst. While traditional regulatory and 
supervisory policies have aimed at forcing creditors to properly price their risk, constructing 
an “incentive-compatible financial safety net” that avoids bail-outs, the recent crises have 
widened the emphasis towards herding behavior by financial institutions and market 
participants and endogenous credit cycles.  Macro-prudential policies, including counter-
cyclical regulatory tools, such a provisioning and capital requirements but also credit growth 
restrictions, have gained prominence in the regulatory toolkit. 
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 On the other hand, Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2011) show for a large firm-survey sample from former 
transition economies that takers of foreign currency borrowers are better equipped than to bear the 
corresponding risks than commonly thought.  Similarly, Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003) do not find that 
unhedged foreign currency positions had a negative impact on firm performance during the East Asian crisis of 
1997.  
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5. Competition, regulation and crises 
This section reviews four specific policy and institutional areas – competition and market 
structure, lending techniques, regulatory policies and SME finance during the crisis. I relate 
this discussion also back to the concept of the access possibilities frontier, introduced in the 
previous section.  
 
5.1. Competition and market structure 
Across the globe, there is a wide variation in market and ownership structures of banking 
system.  On the one hand, there are many small and concentrated banking systems, especially 
in low-income countries, with often fewer than ten banks; on the other hand, Germany has 
several hundred small, locally operating banks. Market structure can change over time, as the 
U.S. has shown, with deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s resulting in a move from many 
small local banks to consolidation and the rise of national banks.   Ownership structures also 
vary significantly across countries, with a few countries still relying heavily on government-
owned banks, other having mostly domestic privately owned banks and others relying mostly 
on foreign-owned banks, such as in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Sub-
Saharan Africa (Claessens and van Horen, 2014). Some countries, such as Mexico, have gone 
from government-owned banking systems over domestic privately owned banks to foreign-
dominated banking systems within a few years (Beck and Martinez Peria, 2010). 
 
The theoretical and empirical literature is ambiguous on the effect of market structure and 
competition in the banking sector on access to finance. While the traditional market 
efficiency view regards more competitive markets as conducive for access to external finance 
(e.g., Pagano, 1993), others point to market power as providing the necessary incentives to 
establish long-term lending relationships (Gerschenkron, 1962; Petersen and Rajan, 
1995).  Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) show that industries in which young firms rely more on 
external finance grow faster in countries with more concentrated banking systems. Similarly, 
Bonacorsi di Patti and Dell'Ariccia (2004) show for Italy that bank concentration is 
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conducive for access to external finance in industries that are less transparent, thus more 
reliant on long-term relationships.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004), on the 
other hand, show that bank concentration increases obstacles to access to finance by SMEs, 
but only in countries with low economic and institutional development.  Similarly, Black and 
Strahan (2002) find for the U.S. that higher concentration is associated with lower new firm 
formation, while Kerr and Nanda (2009) find that higher competition after deregulation led to 
higher entry and exit and thus higher churn among entrepreneurs in the U.S. Using the Lerner 
index as measure of market power, Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell (2009) 
find that higher competition improves credit availability for SMEs in Spain.  
 
Taking a broader view on banks' business lines, Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that more 
competition will reduce profit margins more in transaction than in relationship lending and 
thus push banks towards relationship lending, a hypothesis supported by empirical analysis 
for Belgium (Degryse and Ongena, 2007).  
 
Complicating the debate is the fact that market structure, as for example measured by 
concentration ratios, is not the same as competition, which is also influenced by the 
segmentation and contestability of a market (Claessens and Laeven, 2004).   Further, state 
variables such as the contractual and informational frameworks can influence the 
competitiveness of a financial system through the ability to transfer collateral easily from one 
lender to another and the ability of SMEs to build up reputation capital through a credit 
registry (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004). 
 
Related to the question of market structure is that of bank size.  It has often been conjectured 
that smaller banks with flatter hierarchies and shorter geographic distance between borrower 
and ultimate loan decision taker are more conducive to small business lending, as they are 
more efficient in processing soft information (Berger and Udell, 1995; Stein, 2002). Sapienza 
(2002) and Berger et al. (2005) confirm this hypothesis with data for the U.S. Canales and 
Nanda (2012), on the other hand, show for Mexico that more decentralized banks are indeed 
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more likely to provide larger loans to small enterprises, but are more likely to exploit their 
market power in concentrated markets.  Looking beyond banks, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Singer (2013) show that small-scale financial institutions catering specifically to SMEs are 
not necessarily more effective than large institutions 
 
Finally, the issue of market structure is also related to that of ownership of banks.  Foreign 
bank ownership has been especially controversial in terms of its effects on SMEs' access to 
external finance. On the one hand, cross-border banks can help foster improved corporate 
governance; they can bring in much-needed technology and experience, which should 
translate into increased efficiency of financial intermediation and they can help exploit scale 
economies in the small host countries. On the other hand, the larger reliance of foreign banks 
on hard information about borrowers as opposed to relying on soft information can have 
negative repercussions for riskier and more opaque borrowers if foreign banks crowd out 
domestic banks.
19
 
 
 There is mixed evidence concerning the effect of foreign bank entry on SME lending.  On 
the one hand, firm-survey evidence suggests that firms report lower financing obstacles in 
countries with a higher share of foreign banks, a finding that holds across different size 
groups of firms (Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria, 2006).  This positive effect can be a direct 
or an indirect one.  Foreign banks can bring the necessary know-how and scale to introduce 
new transaction lending techniques. By competing with domestic banks for large corporate 
clients, they can also force domestic banks to go down market to cater to SMEs (de Haas and 
Naaborg, 2005). On the other hand, loan-level information from specific countries suggests 
that foreign banks are less likely to lend to small and opaque companies than domestic banks 
(Mian, 2006; Gormley, 2006). So, any positive effect of foreign bank entry on SME lending 
seems to be more indirect than direct. More recent work on Bolivia, however, suggests that 
foreign and domestic banks can lend to the same clientele, though with different techniques, a 
topic discussed below.  Specifically, the effect might be a function of the informational and 
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contractual frameworks of countries, as argued by Claessens and van Horen (2014) and 
Bruno and Hauswald (2008) who show that foreign bank entry has a positive effect in 
countries with more efficient credit information sharing systems and creditor right protection. 
 
In summary, market and ownership structure are important factors for SME finance and a 
financial system’s location relative to the access possibilities frontier. The evidence, however, 
is not clear-cut, although one could reach the tentative conclusion that competition and 
openness to foreign ownership can help ease SMEs’ financing constraints where the 
necessary institutional and regulatory conditions prevail. 
 
5.2. Lending techniques 
Closely linked with the debate on market and ownership structure and SME finance is the 
discussion on different lending techniques that are appropriate for SME lending. The 
traditional view of SME finance focuses on relationship lending.
20
 Longstanding 
relationships between a financial institution, or even a specific loan officer, and the borrower 
allow problems of information asymmetry and thus risk to be overcome. Relationship-based 
lending, however, is costly, moving the equilibrium away from the possibilities frontier 
discussed earlier.  The focus on relationship lending as underpinning SME finance also 
implies that smaller and local financial institutions are more effective in lending to SMEs 
than large and foreign-owned banks, as already discussed above.  
 
Recently the more nuanced view has been put forward that large and foreign banks, relative 
to other institutions, can have a comparative advantage at financing SMEs through arms-
length lending technologies, such as asset-based lending, factoring, leasing, fixed-asset 
lending, credit scoring, and centralized organizational structures.
21
  While relationship 
lending might thus be better done by small, community-based financial institutions, 
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 Berger and Udell (1998).   
21 See Berger and Udell (2006) and de la Torre, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler (2010). 
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transaction-based lending is more cost-effectively done by large financial institutions that can 
exploit the necessary economies of scale that investment in technology implies. In many 
developing countries, this debate has an additional dimension, because smaller banks are 
often owned by domestic shareholders, while large financial institutions are often foreign-
owned.  However, there is not a perfect mapping of size and ownership, a distinction 
exploited by Clarke et al. (2005) who show across four Latin American countries that large 
foreign banks often have a greater share and higher growth of lending to small businesses 
than large domestic banks, with the reverse holding for small banks of different ownership. 
 
Using data for 91 banks across 45 countries, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2011) 
find that foreign banks are more likely than domestic banks to use transaction-based lending 
techniques and more centralized business models. However, they also show that foreign 
banks do not tend to lend less to SMEs than other banks. It thus seems that both relationship- 
and transaction-based lending techniques are appropriate for SME lending, and that both 
domestic and foreign-owned banks can cater to SMEs. 
 
More recent evidence suggests that foreign and domestic banks can cater to the same clientele, 
by using different lending techniques.  Specifically, Beck, Ioannidou and Schäfer (2012) find 
for Bolivia that foreign and domestic use different lending techniques for the same clientele, 
with foreign banks relying more on internal ratings, collateral and shorter maturities as 
disciplining tools and domestic banks relying more on relationship lending.  However, this 
also suggests that transaction-based lending and thus effective lending to SMEs by foreign 
banks relies on several basic institutional pre-requisites, including collateral and credit 
registries, as already discussed above.  
 
There are also specific transaction-based lending techniques that seem especially conducive 
for expanding SMEs’ access to external finance. Leasing is an attractive financing tool for 
SMEs—from the perspective of both demand and supply—because it is based on the cash 
flow of the financed asset, such as machinery or vehicle, rather than the reputation or the 
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asset base of the enterprise. It also often includes tax advantages, and it allows for easier 
recovery if the correct legal framework is in place.  Factoring, the discounting of accounts 
receivables, is attractive for small suppliers of large credit-worthy buyers because it does not 
rely on information about the borrower, but rather on the obligor.
22
  Both leasing and 
factoring rely on a legal framework to govern the transactions but rely to a lesser extent on 
the contractual framework of a country. Thus these techniques can help push a financial 
system toward the frontier of SME lending, even if this frontier is low. 
  
5.3. SME finance through the economic cycle 
There is ample evidence for the cyclical behavior of bank lending over the business cycle, 
with total lending volume typically being more volatile than economic activity.  One 
important channel is borrowers’ net worth, which determines borrowing capacity. Financial 
intermediation can thus exacerbate economic cycles through an accelerator effect (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1989).   This cyclical behavior can be made worse by capital requirements, as I 
will discuss in more detail below. Given that smaller firms rely more on bank finance than 
large corporations, this implies that SMEs are financially more constrained during crises than 
other firms.  
 
In addition, banking credit is an important transmission channel for monetary policy.   First, 
monetary policy typically has a more prominent impact on smaller banks that are less able to 
raise alternative funding in the case of monetary tightening and have to reduce loan supply 
more than larger banks (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). If smaller banks lend more to smaller 
enterprises, this would then have also a disproportionally more negative effect on SME 
lending. However, as discussed above, bank size does not have an unambiguous relationship 
with the share of SME lending.  Second, monetary tightening reduces collateral values and 
thus creditworthiness, especially for smaller enterprises that will therefore suffer more from 
monetary tightening (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).   
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Bank failures, both idiosyncratic and during systemic banking crises, have severe negative 
repercussions for their borrowers, as shown by several studies. Bernanke (1983), Calomiris 
and Mason (2003), and Kupiec and Ramirez (2009) show the negative economic 
repercussions of bank failures in the 1920s and ’30s in the United States and the consequent 
loss of lending relationships, while Ashcraft (2005) documents the decline in lending and 
local GDP following the closure of a large (solvent) affiliate in a regional bank holding 
company in Texas in the 1990s. Ferri, Kang, and Kim (2001), and Djankov, Jindra, and 
Klapper (2005), respectively, have shown the importance of lending relationships across a 
sample of Korean firms that worked with either failed or surviving banks after the crisis and 
the negative effect of bank insolvency announcement during the East Asian crisis on market 
values of the banks’ borrowers. On a more aggregate level, cross-country comparisons have 
shown that during banking crises, industries that depend more on external finance are hurt 
disproportionately more, an effect that is stronger in countries with better developed financial 
systems (Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan, 2008: Braun and Larrain, 2005; Kroszner, 
Laeven, and Klingebiel, 2007). 
 
There is also evidence for the negative repercussions of not aggressively addressing bank 
fragility, with lessons for the current Eurozone crisis.  Specifically, Peek and Rosengren 
(2005) show that Japanese firms are far more likely to receive additional credit if they are in 
poor financial condition, and these firms continue to perform poorly after receiving additional 
bank financing. This phenomenon can be explained with banks evergreening non-performing 
loans to avoid recognition of losses. Ahearne and Shinada (2005) show the negative 
repercussions of this phenomenon, by documenting that productivity growth is low in 
industries reputed to have heavy concentrations of zombie firms. 
 
There is also evidence on an interaction between banking market structure and systemic 
banking crises in their effect on SMEs’ financing constraints. Popov and Udell (2012) find 
evidence for a propagation of banking distress in Western Europe to their subsidiaries in 
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Central and Eastern Europe, ultimately reducing SMEs’ access to finance in these countries. 
Presbitero, Udell and Zazzaro (2014) show for a sample of Italian SMEs that the effect of the 
recent financial crisis has been larger in provinces with a larger share of non-local banks that 
are distantly managed.  
 
While there is evidence that SMEs might be able to substitute bank credit for trade credit 
during times of crisis (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Fisman and Love, 2003), Love, Preve and 
Sarria-Allende (2007) show for a sample six crisis countries in Latin America and East Asia 
that trade credit dropped dramatically, starting a few months after the onset of the crisis. They 
explain their finding with fact that during systemic crises, large enterprises also lose easy 
access to bank credit and are therefore not able to pass on this funding in the form of trade 
credit to financially even more constrained enterprises. While bank and trade credit are thus 
substitutes during normal economic cycles, they are complements during systemic banking 
crises. Taketa and Udell (2007) confirm this enterprise data for Japan and the credit crunch 
period in the mid-1990s. 
 
5.4. Regulatory policies and reform 
Regulatory policies can be important to push the system towards the frontier of SME lending 
or prevent the systems from moving to the frontier.  I would like to point out just a few here.  
First, loan classification and provisioning rules can affect SMEs’ access to finance, through 
reliance less on collateral than on forward-looking assessment of payment performance. 
Specifically, loan classification systems that rely completely on collateral typically bias 
against SMEs who have less “hard” collateral available.   
 
Second, capital requirements can be an important factor. Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe (2006) 
show that SME lending might require more provisioning but less capital, given that the 
distribution of losses from small loans is less skewed than that for large loans. Further, the 
reliance of risk weights for assets on market assessment introduces a bias against SMEs, 
which are typically perceived as riskier.  This bias is exacerbated over the business cycle as 
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the creditworthiness of SME varies typically more than that of large enterprises, as I have 
discussed above.  While financial stability concerns might be a justification for such a bias, it 
is important to understand that this bias might undermine SMEs’ access to bank finance.   
 
This cyclical effect of capital requirements on lending is exacerbated by introducing time-
varying risk weights, such as done under Basel 2. This will make capital requirements even 
more procyclical inducing a reduction of the credit supply in down-turns and overshooting in 
an upturn (Repullo and Suarez, 2012).  There is some empirical evidence on the effect of 
risk-weighted capital requirements for the U.S.; e.g., Hancock and Wilcox (1998) show that 
during the credit crunch period in the early 1990s, small banks shrank their loan portfolios 
more than large banks did and this had a larger effect on the real economy.  
 
In the context of the Basel 3 discussions on tighter capital and liquidity requirements, the 
issue of SME financing constraints has been raised again.  While it is not clear whether 
higher capital requirements per se will result in reduced SME lending, the risk weighting 
system under new Basel 3 regime tends to be skewed towards larger firms. For example, a 
large firm with an AAA rating is assigned a 20% risk weight, while an SME that is unrated is 
assigned a 100% or 75% risk weight, implying significant higher capital charges for SME 
lending than for lending to large rated enterprises.
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6. Conclusions 
While the size of the SME segment is not important for economic development, its dynamism 
is. Financial deepening can help alleviating SMEs’ financing constraints and through this 
channel reduce poverty and create high-quality jobs.  In terms of policy interventions to 
foster SME finance, it is important to distinguish between policy areas on several levels, 
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including long-term institution building and more short-to medium-term regulatory policy 
changes and interventions to overcome demand and supply-side constraints.  It is important to 
note that some policies reforms involve a trade-off between financial stability and deepening 
and political decisions are necessary to decide on these trade-offs. To give just a few 
examples: Rapid credit expansion can lead to fragility, especially if in a poor institutional and 
regulatory environment; increased competition following liberalization can undermine 
stability; and partial credit guarantees can entice aggressive risk-taking.   
 
While a lot of evidence has been collected on the relationship between financial deepening 
and banking markets structure, on the one hand, and SMEs’ financing constraints, on the 
other hand, much less is known about the effectiveness of specific financing forms and policy 
interventions. What is the availability and impact of alternative financing forms, such as 
leasing and factoring?  What is the equity gap in SMEs and to which extent can equity funds 
contribute to filling it? What are the effects of public policy interventions, such as partial 
credit guarantees – under which circumstances and with which design features do they work 
best? Similarly, what is the impact of demand-side interventions such as financial literacy and 
managerial capital programs? While there is an extensive but still growing literature gauging 
the impact of specific interventions on micro-entrepreneurs, there is an increasing interest to 
go beyond micro- to small and medium-sized enterprises, though such a move poses 
significant problems for applying RCTs, most prominently in terms of number of 
observations and properly identifying and maintaining a control group, as well as the higher 
cost of budgeting an SME finance RCT as compared to a microfinance RCT.  
 
While there are still many open questions, the literature so far does allow some critical 
policy-relevant insights. First, specific policy reforms and interventions might have a 
different impact on enterprises and entrepreneurs of different age, gender, size and motivation. 
Future design and assessment of interventions and policy reforms should focus more on such 
differential effects.  Second, there is a critical interaction between different policies and 
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interventions; to cite just one example given earlier, competition and foreign bank entry have 
different impacts on SMEs’ access to finance depending on the contractual and information 
frameworks in the respective country. This also implies that one size does not fit all. 
Different policies and interventions might be relevant for different countries and in different 
circumstances. A third and more general conclusion for future evaluations is that different 
research methodologies are called for to assess different policies and interventions, depending 
on whether the assessment is ex-ante or ex-post, whether the implementation is in a 
geographically restricted area or on the national level, and what kind of data are available. As 
with policies, one research methodology does not fit all circumstances. Fourth, more data are 
needed both on the importance of SMEs in the real economy as on the financing of SME. The 
Enterprise Surveys have provided enormous opportunities for analysts and researchers, but 
still lack information on many aspects of firms’ “financial life”, such as more detailed 
financing information. Panel samples, where firms are being revisited in regular intervals and 
as increasingly implemented for a larger and broader sample of countries, will allow 
researchers to test for the effect of policy reforms or changes in financial market structure 
over time. Surveys of informal enterprises and their constraints can provide additional 
important insights. Databases on entrepreneurs (Klapper et al., 2010) and surveys of potential 
and actual entrepreneurs (Djankov et al., 2006) can provide important information into the 
demand side of SME finance. 
 
Going forward, analysis and research should focus on gauging what policies and 
interventions work best to ease SMEs’ financing constraints.  More money might not always 
be the solution, whereas smart interventions, often based on public-private partnerships, 
might help.  And these solutions are most likely country-specific and tailored to specific 
circumstances.  
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